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EVIDENCE-BASED PROMULGATION:  
RECONSIDERING THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
FOR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Emily S. Taylor Poppe* 
 
Annika asked anxiously, . . . .  “isn’t there any mother or father here?” 
“No, not one,” said Pippi cheerfully. 
“But who tells you to go to bed at night and things like that?” asked 
Annika. 
“I do,” said Pippi.  “First I tell myself once, very nicely, and if I don’t 
obey, then I tell myself again, very sternly, and if I still don’t obey, then 
it’s time for a spanking, of course.” 
—Astrid Lindgren, Pippi Longstocking1 
INTRODUCTION 
Much like the indomitable Pippi Longstocking, the legal profession has 
succeeded for decades in asserting its right to self-regulate.2  Judges play a 
key role in this regulatory regime, serving as both rulemakers and enforcers.3  
Indeed, prompted by the efforts of the organized bar,4 the judiciary claims 
the inherent—and exclusive—right to regulate the practice of law on the 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.  This Article 
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by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 9, 2020, at 
Fordham University School of Law.  Thank you to Professor Bruce A. Green for the invitation 
to participate and to participants for their helpful feedback.  Thank you also to Alaina Persinger 
and Harrison Weimer for their valuable research assistance. 
 
 1. ASTRID LINDGREN, PIPPI LONGSTOCKING 19 (Tiina Nunnally trans., Viking Press 
2007) (1945). 
 2. Indeed, self-regulation is one of the defining characteristics of the professions. See 
Abraham Flexner, Is Social Work a Profession?, 42 NAT’L CONF. CHARITIES & CORR. 576, 
581 (1915), reprinted in 11 RSCH. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 152, 156 (2001) (noting that 
professions “tend to self-organization”). 
 3. See, e.g., Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149, 
152–53 (2010) (noting judges’ multiple roles in regulating the legal profession). 
 4. Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal Bootleggers”—the Role 
of the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts’ Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth 
Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 68–69 (2009) (describing the role of the organized bar in 
shaping the basis for professional self-regulation). 
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basis of the separation of powers doctrine.5  This claimed right includes 
establishing the boundaries of what constitutes the practice of law, thus 
effectively maintaining the profession’s monopoly over the provision of legal 
services.6 
Yet this arrangement is under attack on several fronts.  Lawyers 
increasingly face regulation from other quarters.7  Much of this regulation is 
federal, occurring through the application of substantive federal law and the 
regulation of lawyers appearing before certain federal agencies.8  Indeed, the 
multijurisdictional nature of modern practice has led to calls to move beyond 
this piecemeal encroachment in favor of the federalization of professional 
regulation.9  However, there are also other sources of authority that shape 
lawyers’ behavior, including malpractice insurers,10 title insurers,11 and 
professional organizations.12  In addition, international jurisdictions also 
impose obligations on lawyers and exert further pressure on the existing U.S. 
regulatory system through the adoption of innovative regulations.13 
Meanwhile, the profession’s ongoing failure to address inequalities in 
access to justice provokes further opposition to the existing regulatory 
regime.  Decades of empirical research documents the public’s limited use of 
lawyers to address civil legal problems.14  Building on this evidence, many 
 
 5. Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—the Role of the Inherent-
Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 14–16 (1989) (describing courts’ use of the 
negative inherent-powers doctrine to exert exclusive control over the legal profession).  The 
premise that the judiciary possesses the exclusive authority to regulate the legal profession is 
challenged in theory and practice. See Wald, supra note 3, at 155. 
 6. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
 7. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 3, at 156; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate 
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 803 (1992). 
 8. Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy:  The 
Federalization of Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court, and Agency Regulation, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 123, 128, 132 (2011). 
 9. See Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future 
of the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 531 (2011) 
(proposing national practice rules but with the reservation of state control over other aspects 
of professional regulation); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
335, 379–80 (1994) (offering an early prediction of this shift and advocating for the 
federalization of legal ethics). 
 10. Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 210 (1996); Leslie C. Levin, Regulators at the Margins:  The Impact 
of Malpractice Insurers on Solo and Small Firm Lawyers, 49 CONN. L. REV. 553, 595 (2016) 
(finding evidence of insurance having a modest impact on insured lawyers’ conduct). 
 11. Levin, supra note 10, at 604–08 (describing ways in which lawyers’ behavior is 
shaped by requirements governing title agents). 
 12. Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior:  The Sources and Uses of Protocols 
in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 891 (2002) (noting, for example, protocols 
for lawyer behavior issued by the American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel and the 
American Bar Association Business Law Section). 
 13. Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 8, at 146–47 (“Competition from international 
firms for a worldwide market for legal services also pressures U.S. regulatory structures to 
consider alternate models being adopted abroad.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:  
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 546 (1980); see also REBECCA 
L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND., ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA:  FINDINGS 
2021] EVIDENCE-BASED PROMULGATION 1277 
access to justice scholars and practitioners advocate a move away from 
exclusive reliance on traditional lawyer- and court-centric approaches to 
equalizing access to justice.15  These proposals are buttressed by a growing 
body of empirical evidence documenting the benefits offered by nonlawyer 
legal service providers16 and the dearth of evidence that consumers are 
harmed by alternative sources of legal assistance.17 
Among these alternative sources of legal assistance are various forms of 
legal technology.  As these technologies become more sophisticated, moving 
from the delivery of static legal information to drafting legal documents and 
answering legal questions, they veer closer to the practice of law.  However, 
some see these technologies as having the potential to expand access to 
justice, either by obviating the need for recourse to a lawyer18 or by making 
lawyers more efficient such that latent markets can be economically served.19  
This potential makes it more politically difficult to constrain their 
 
FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY 12 (2014), 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_accessing_justice_
in_the_contemporary_usa._aug._2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/64KQ-82J8] (documenting the 
very limited use of lawyers, despite the prevalence of civil legal problems, among a sample of 
residents in a midwestern city).  This finding is consistent with studies in other countries. See 
OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., LEGAL NEEDS SURVEYS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 33–34 
(2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/g2g9a36c-en.pdf?expires=1609961717&id 
=id&accname=guest&checksum=90B0AB10172D2814D16E431BB2756C65 
[https://perma.cc/SFZ8-V4S6] (noting similar findings in a number of foreign jurisdictions); 
see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP:  MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS 
OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/ 
TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP5C-W3DW] (“86% of the civil legal 
problems reported by low-income Americans in the past year received inadequate or no legal 
help.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Pascoe Pleasence & Nigel J. Balmer, Justice & the Capability to Function 
in Society, DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 140, 141; Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 
DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 49, 49–50 (2019). 
 16. See, e.g., REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & THOMAS M. CLARKE, ROLES BEYOND LAWYERS:  
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESEARCH REPORT 4 (2016) 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/new_york_city_court_navig
ators_report_final_with_final_links_december_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/79ZZ-A92U] 
(reporting results of an evaluation analysis of multiple nonlawyer legal intervention programs 
and finding “evidence that assistance from appropriately trained and supervised individuals 
without formal legal training is associated with changes in a range of outcomes, including both 
legal and real-life outcomes”). 
 17. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 214–15 (1990).  The existence of randomized control studies that fail to 
find that individuals who receive an offer of legal assistance achieve more favorable outcomes 
further fuels the debate. See, e.g., James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized 
Evaluation in Legal Assistance:  What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) 
Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2118 (2012). 
 18. See Benjamin H. Barton, Technology Can Solve Much of America’s Access to Justice 
Problem, If We Let It, in BEYOND ELITE LAW:  ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 444, 445 
(Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016). 
 19. See Albert H. Yoon, The Post-modern Lawyer:  Technology and the Democratization 
of Legal Representation, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 456, 470–71 (2016). 
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development.20  Whether this techno-optimism is justified is debatable,21 but 
it has nevertheless inspired calls for regulatory reform to enable these access 
to justice developments.22 
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina Board of 
Dental Examiners v. FTC23 raises the specter of antitrust actions against the 
current regulatory scheme actors.24  In that case, the Supreme Court held that 
the North Carolina state dental board, which included a controlling number 
of active market participants, was not entitled to automatic state-action 
immunity from antitrust investigation.25  There has long been criticism that 
self-interest motivates the regulation of the legal profession;26 the holding in 
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners has the potential to give 
consequence to these concerns.27 
Reflecting these pressures, the American Bar Association (ABA) passed 
Resolution 115 in February 2020, after substantial debate.28  The resolution 
 
 20. See, e.g., STATE BAR OF CAL. TASK FORCE ON ACCESS THROUGH INNOVATION OF LEGAL 
SERVS., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2020), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/ 
documents/publicComment/ATILS-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UV8-EFQD] (“The 
work of [the Task Force on Access Through Innovation of Legal Services] was animated by 
the inescapable conclusion that nearly all Californians are facing severe challenges in 
obtaining access to legal services for commonly encountered legal problems.”). 
 21. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR ET AL., LEGAL TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS:  REPORT OF THE 
SURVEY OF US LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES 14–16 (2019), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/ 
uploads/cms/documents/report_us_digital_legal_tech_for_nonlawyers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5U72-D2FU] (noting the limitations of existing legal technology aimed at 
expanding access to justice); Tanina Rostain, Techno-optimism & Access to the Legal System, 
DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 93, 94 (cautioning against unsubstantiated techno-optimism). 
 22. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 18, at 445 (noting that “[t]he greatest danger to the power 
of technology [to expand access to civil justice] is the beneficiaries of the status quo”). 
 23. 574 U.S. 494 (2015). 
 24. Elizabeth Chambliss, Evidence-Based Lawyer Regulation, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 297, 
309 (2019) (noting that the case “signaled the end of [the] laissez-faire approach to 
professional self-regulation”). 
 25. N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 515 (“The Sherman Act protects competition 
while also respecting federalism.  It does not authorize the States to abandon markets to the 
unsupervised control of active market participants . . . .”). 
 26. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary 
Practice:  Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values 
Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2000) (noting the evolving but consistently self-
interested bases for regulations preventing lawyers’ association with nonlawyers); Deborah L. 
Rhode, Professional Integrity and Professional Regulation:  Nonlawyer Practice and 
Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 39 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 111, 114–15 
(2016).  Scholars have long recognized the inherent potential for self-interest in self-regulatory 
regimes more generally. See, e.g., Flexner, supra note 2, at 156 (“There is, of course, always 
danger that the interests of [a professional] organization may conflict with those of the body 
politic.”). 
 27. See Chambliss, supra note 24, at 300–01; Deborah L. Rhode & Benjamin H. Barton, 
Rethinking Self-Regulation:  Antitrust Perspectives on Bar Governance Activity, 20 CHAP. L. 
REV. 267, 280 (2017). 
 28. Matt Reynolds, To Increase Access to Justice, Regulatory Innovation Should Be 
Considered, ABA House Says, ABA J. (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/resolution-115 [https://perma.cc/LT6D-YZYW] (reporting on the resolution’s 
passage).  Similar debates occurred in response to ABA Resolution 105, which adopted the 
ABA Model Regulatory Objectives for the Provision of Legal Services. See Chambliss, supra 
note 24, at 315. 
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“encourages U.S. jurisdictions to consider regulatory innovations” to address 
the access to justice crisis.29  Although the adopted resolution provides that 
nothing in it “should be construed as recommending any changes to any of 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,”30 this compromise language 
belies the pressure for reform indicated by the resolution as a whole.31  After 
decades of being encouraged to achieve uniformity in professional 
regulation, state regulators face increasing pressure to chart their own paths. 
As they do so, ABA Resolution 115 “encourages U.S. jurisdictions to 
collect and assess data regarding regulatory innovations both before and after 
their adoption.”32  Scholars have also called for a shift toward evidence-based 
regulation, noting its potential to counter challenges to the current regulatory 
regime.33  This shift mirrors trends in access to justice34 and the law more 
broadly.35  Yet these proposals have generally been limited to the substance 
of professional regulation.  In this Article, I propose an additional shift—one 
toward evidence-based promulgation. 
State supreme courts have long been criticized for their work in 
promulgating rules of professional conduct.  In particular, they are accused 
of abdicating their responsibility by delegating the work of drafting to the 
organized bar, which is seen as evidence of self-interested action and in-
group bias in favor of lawyers.36  On these grounds, multiple institutional 
analyses have concluded that other institutions are better suited to the task of 
regulating the legal profession.37  However, these analyses have generally 
presumed the current formulation of judicial regulation in their analyses.38  
 
 29. AM. BAR ASS’N, REVISED RESOLUTION 115 AND REPORT (2020) [hereinafter ABA 
RESOLUTION 115], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/center-for-
innovation/r115resandreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LCS-9VGL] (providing the revised 
resolution and final report). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Reynolds, supra note 28. 
 32. ABA RESOLUTION 115, supra note 29, at 1. 
 33. Chambliss, supra note 24, at 304 (arguing that evidence-based regulation provides the 
most prudent response to challenges to self-regulation, including the growing body of 
evidence supporting the value of nonlawyer legal service providers). 
 34. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of 
Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 103 (noting the increasing interest in access to justice 
research and calling for empirical investigation that could lead to more effective 
interventions). 
 35. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Legal Scholarship:  Observations on 
Moving Forward, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1229–31 (2019) (tracking the growth of empirical 
legal scholarship). 
 36. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation:  Who Should 
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1208 
(2003) (“State supreme courts have satisfied their own and lawyers’ interests by delegating 
virtually all of their regulatory authority under the vaunted system of ‘lawyer self-
regulation.’”). 
 37. Id. at 1172–73 (arguing that Congress or state legislatures are better positioned to 
regulate lawyers); see also Wilkins, supra note 7, at 875–76 (performing an institutional 
analysis focused on enforcement of disciplinary rules). 
 38. See Wald, supra note 3, at 158–60; Zacharias, supra note 9, at 338 (“My conclusion 
that the federalization of legal ethics may be inevitable rests largely on states’ failure to 
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In this Article, I ask how empirical evidence could be harnessed to reform 
the rule promulgation process and whether doing so might overcome 
objections to the current model.39 
I begin by considering states’ current processes for promulgating rules.  I 
identify many overlapping sources of legal authority that can inform 
promulgation and describe some of the key dimensions on which 
promulgation processes vary.40  Importantly, I also note that, despite the 
framework of authority that surrounds the promulgation process, it remains 
one that is largely discretionary. 
Building on these insights, I consider how states might use empirical 
evidence to reform rule promulgation.41  This includes drawing on best 
practices developed in other rulemaking contexts, developing mechanisms 
for integrating external expertise, formalizing consumer protections, and 
considering the composition of rulemakers.  Together, these insights may 
inform the creation of standardized promulgation processes designed to 
improve the regulation of the profession. 
In arguing for a shift to evidence-based promulgation, I extend the existing 
call for evidence-based regulation.42  I suggest that this shift offers a potential 
way forward for the regulation of the profession, addressing the alleged 
hypocrisy and inefficacy of the existing scheme without resorting to more 
radical alternatives.  However, reflecting on the profession’s history of self-
regulation, I also acknowledge the barriers to adopting evidence-based 
promulgation.  Even if these barriers are overcome, I also recognize that the 
implementation of these processes may fail to address other underlying 
problems with the current regulatory regime. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I considers variation in the rule 
promulgation process across the states.  Part II identifies ways in which the 
promulgation process might be reformed on the basis of empirical evidence.  
Part III considers the potential benefits and limitations to this approach and 
is followed by a brief conclusion. 
I.  THE PROMULGATION PROCESS 
Although the highest court in each state is responsible for adopting rules 
of professional conduct, these courts have historically delegated much of 
their responsibility to the organized bar in that state.43  This delegation is 
 
address the problems I identify and on my sense that states will not address those problems 
aggressively in the future.”). 
 39. In doing so, I take seriously the suggestion that we examine the judicial role in the 
rulemaking process. Wald, supra note 3, at 161 (advocating that “the public should not take 
judicial promulgation of rules of conduct for granted, but instead subject it to close scrutiny”); 
see also Barton, supra note 36, at 1171 n.14 (“Given a problematic regulatory outcome, 
administrative law scholars suggest a close analysis of the regulatory process to determine 
what changes, if any, might improve the regulatory output.”). 
 40. See infra Part I. 
 41. See infra Part II. 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. Green, supra note 26, at 1136. 
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illustrated most clearly by the role of the ABA in drafting the model rules of 
conduct that have been adopted in most states.44  The ABA also facilitates a 
comment period on proposed revisions and offers states a guide to implement 
the model rules.45  Through these activities the ABA determines the timing 
and substance of reforms and also oversees the national discourse on 
professional regulation. 
The outsized role of the ABA and general structural similarities across 
state promulgation processes have tended to overshadow procedural 
variation among the states.  These processes are regulated by multiple 
overlapping sources of authority, including state constitutions, statutory 
provisions governing occupational licensure and government transparency, 
court rules adopted by the states’ highest courts, and—if any rulemaking 
authority is delegated to the state bar—bylaws of the state bar associations.46  
Layered on top of these binding provisions are customary practices that may 
be applied consistently or on an ad hoc basis. 
The multiple sources of authority that govern the promulgation process in 
Maryland illustrate well the multifaceted regulation of professional conduct 
rulemaking.  Maryland’s constitution establishes the rulemaking authority of 
the state’s highest court, providing that “[t]he Court of Appeals from time to 
time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure 
in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this 
State.”47  A state statutory provision authorizes the court to delegate its 
rulemaking authority:  “To aid in the exercise of its rulemaking powers, the 
Court of Appeals may appoint a standing committee of lawyers, judges, and 
other persons competent in judicial practice, procedure or administration.”48  
Such a committee, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, has been in place pursuant to court of appeals appointment since 
1946.49  The Standing Committee may, in turn, delegate some of its 
responsibilities to subcommittees, although these are “not public bodies, (not 
having been created by statute or Rule).”50 
 
 44. See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 
28, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ 
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules 
[https://perma.cc/9MQF-PT6N]. 
 45. See Policy & Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/policy [https://perma.cc/W5HX-ES27] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) 
(“The Center Policy Implementation Committee provides assistance to jurisdictions on the 
review and implementation of adopted policy . . . .”). 
 46. See Appendix (identifying examples, by state, of legal authority controlling the 
promulgation process and descriptions of the promulgation process). 
 47. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a). 
 48. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 13-301 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 49. Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, MD. CTS., 
https://www.mdcourts.gov/rules [https://perma.cc/7977-S9HC] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) 
(noting that this committee replaced an ad hoc committee established in 1940). 
 50. MD. STANDING COMM. ON RULES AND PROC., 205TH REPORT TO THE COURT OF 
APPEALS:  NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULES CHANGES 3 (2020), https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/rules/reports/205threport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MMS-FQY5]. 
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The composition of the Standing Committee is directed by court rule, 
which provides that the committee 
shall consist of one incumbent judge of the Court of Special Appeals, three 
incumbent circuit court judges, three incumbent judges of the District 
Court, one member of the State Senate, one member of the House of 
Delegates, one clerk of a circuit court, and such other individuals 
determined by the Court of Appeals.51 
Court rules also govern the terms for which these committee members 
serve.52 
Other rules adopted by the state’s highest court require that the Standing 
Committee post notice of all its meetings on the judiciary’s website and that 
all meetings must be open to the public.53  Because it is a public body, the 
Standing Committee is also subject to the state’s Open Meetings Act,54 which 
similarly requires public notice of meetings,55 posting of meeting agendas,56 
and open attendance.57  Together, these provisions effectively require that 
proposed amendments to the state’s rules of professional conduct are subject 
to public notice, although there is no rule requiring a formal notice and 
comment period. 
Notably, the Maryland State Bar Association is not formally incorporated 
into this process.  The Maryland State Bar Association maintains a 
Committee on Rules of Practice, the “principal function” of which “is to 
follow the proceedings of the Maryland Court of Appeals’ Rules Committee 
and to serve as the liaison between the MSBA and the Court’s Rules 
Committee.”58  However, this bar association committee exists outside of the 
formal promulgation process laid out by state law and rules. 
Thus, the Maryland promulgation process remains under the auspices of 
the state supreme court, is largely carried out by a committee of judges and 
legislators appointed by that court, and does not explicitly involve the state 
bar.  In many ways, the process is quite formalized, at least in terms of the 
parties involved and the requirements regarding public notice.  At the same 
time, despite the formalization of this process, the court retains discretion.  
For example, court rules provide that, “[u]nless the Court of Appeals 
determines otherwise, every suggestion made to it for the adoption, 
amendment, or rescission of a Maryland Rule shall be referred to the Rules 
 
 51. MD. CT. R. 16-701(b).  For the current composition of the Standing Committee, see 
Court of Appeals Committees:  Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, MD. 
MANUAL ON-LINE (Nov. 13, 2020), https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/29ap/html/ 
rules.html [https://perma.cc/3XN9-RDKP]. 
 52. MD. CT. R. 16-701(d). 
 53. Id. r. 16-701(f). 
 54. MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROV. § 3-301–501 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 55. Id. § 3-302. 
 56. Id. § 3-302.1. 
 57. Id. § 3-303. 
 58. MBSA Committee:  Rules of Practice, MD. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.msba.org/ 
for-members/committees/rules-of-practice [https://perma.cc/DXP9-3GTT] (last visited Jan. 
27, 2021). 
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Committee for consideration.”59  Thus, despite the fact that the court of 
appeals is permitted to delegate its rulemaking authority and has done so in 
the past, it is not legally bound to do so in the future. 
The promulgation processes in many other states are not as highly 
formalized and often differ in the roles assigned to various parties.60  In some 
states, rulemaking authority is delegated to the state bar; in California, for 
example, the California Supreme Court retains authority to approve rules of 
professional conduct but the State Bar of California is charged with 
promulgating them.61  In other states, there may be multiple committees to 
which rulemaking authority is delegated, such as in South Carolina, where 
the state uses both a state bar association Professional Responsibility 
Committee62 and a Commission on the Profession63 established by the 
judiciary.64  The roles of the judiciary and the legislature in regulating the 
process can also vary.  Here again, California offers an interesting example.  
There, the state bar is regulated by legislation—the State Bar Act65—as 
opposed to rules promulgated by the state’s highest court.  Mandatory sunset 
provisions, in which professional regulatory agencies are automatically 
terminated unless reauthorized, are another way in which judicial and 
legislative oversight of the legal profession may interact.66 
We lack both a theoretical framework for cataloging this variation and 
empirical analysis of its influence in practice,67 making this an area ripe for 
further investigation.  What is clear, however, is that variation in the 
regulation and practice of the rule promulgation process can substantially 
affect who the decision makers are, the extent to which members of the bar 
or the public are able to intervene, and the transparency with which the 
promulgation process is carried out.  These factors may be consequential for 
the substance of regulations governing the legal profession.68  Moreover, in 
states where the process is less formalized, there is an opportunity for 
 
 59. MD. CT. R. 16-701(g) (emphasis added). 
 60. See sources cited infra Appendix. 
 61. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6076–77 (West 2020). 
 62. Professional Responsibility Committee, S.C. BAR, https://www.scbar.org/lawyers/ 
sections-committees-divisions/committees/professional-responsibility-committee/ 
?edit_off=true [https://perma.cc/8D3S-24BN] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (explaining that the 
committee is charged with reviewing “laws and rules regulating the practice of law”). 
 63. S.C. APP. CT. R. 420 (establishing the Chief Justice’s Commission on the Profession 
and providing guidelines controlling its composition). 
 64. See, e.g., Email from Elizabeth Chambliss, Professor, Univ. of South Carolina Sch. of 
L. to Harrison Weimer (Sept. 3, 2020) (on file with author) (describing the rule promulgation 
process in South Carolina). 
 65. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6600–43. 
 66. See, e.g., Robert J. Derocher, State Bar of Texas’ Sunset Review:  A Validation, and a 
Challenge, BAR LEADER, July–Aug. 2002, at 6, 6 (describing a sunset review of the Texas 
bar). 
 67. But see John S. Dzienkowski & John M. Golden, Reasoned Decisionmaking for Legal 
Ethics Regulation, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1148–49 (2021); Leslie C. Levin, The Politics 
of Lawyer Regulation:  The Case of Malpractice Insurance, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 969, 
973 (2020) (using case studies investigating variation in state requirements regarding 
malpractice insurance to consider how and when states will adopt “public-regarding” laws). 
 68. Levin, supra note 67, at 978–80. 
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variation over time and across substantive proposals; while this provides 
opportunities to customize the process according to the scope and content of 
particular proposals, it also suggests that there is little consideration of 
universal evidence-based best practices. 
II.  TOWARD EVIDENCE-BASED PROMULGATION 
In this part, I consider how empirical evidence might enhance the design 
of state rule promulgation processes for rules of professional conduct.  
Specifically, I consider best practices for rulemaking adopted from other 
contexts, ways to integrate external expertise, mechanisms for formalizing 
consumer protection, and the importance of directing attention to the 
composition of rulemaking bodies. 
A.  Best Practices for Rulemaking 
To a large extent, the issues involved in developing regulations for the 
legal profession parallel those that arise in administrative rulemaking more 
broadly.  The Administrative Procedures Act69 (APA) outlines several core 
tenets that undergird the administrative rulemaking process at the federal 
level.70  These include advance notice of proposed rulemaking, a period for 
comments from the public, and dissemination of the final rule.71  In some 
cases, the APA also requires that agencies offer evidence in support of the 
adopted rule.72 
Many of these elements are apparent in the rulemaking process adopted by 
the ABA, where much of the debate regarding proposed rules is centered.  
Some aspects have also been adopted at the state level.  However, there is no 
similar set of prescribed practices that has been broadly accepted in the 
context of the professional regulation of lawyers.  Not surprisingly, debates 
have emerged on key issues, such as how the evidentiary burden supporting 
the adoption of new rules should be allocated.73 
The ABA has opined on best practices for administrative rulemaking.74  It 
could draw on this expertise to support states seeking to enhance the 
processes through which state rules of professional conduct are generated and 
adopted.75  Other bar associations, academics, and interested parties could 
also address the need for evidence-based best practices. 
 
 69. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06. 
 70. See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA 
L. REV. 185, 186 (1996). 
 71. Id. at 186–87. 
 72. Id. at 187. 
 73. Green, supra note 26, at 1117–18. 
 74. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2017) (summarizing ABA recommendations for updates to the APA). 
 75. See Dzienkowski & Golden, supra note 67, at 1148. 
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B.  Integration of External Expertise 
In addition to general best practices for rulemaking, a second issue facing 
states seeking to enhance their promulgation processes is whether and how 
to incorporate external expertise.  Currently, many states overcome any 
deficits in their substantive expertise by relying heavily on the organized bar.  
But this approach raises questions about the organized bar’s ability to look 
beyond its own interests in support of regulations that serve the public 
interest. 
Several alternatives exist that could allow for the integration of external 
expertise into the promulgation process.  Professor Eli Wald suggests that the 
Conference of Chief Justices could generate drafts of model rules, thus 
displacing the organized bar as the primary source of regulation.76  The 
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System advocates the 
role of a third-party regulator.77  Professor Andrew Kaufman has suggested 
additional roles for the National Center for State Courts and the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.78  Each of these approaches offers 
a mechanism for incorporating expertise from sources other than the ABA 
and state bar associations. 
Relatedly, a shift toward evidence-based regulation requires greater 
engagement with empirical data and analysis.  This is a task for which state 
supreme courts are not necessarily well suited.  Although focused on the 
substance of regulation, scholars have offered several suggestions for how to 
enhance the availability of relevant empirical data and analysis.  Professor 
Carole Silver proposes that the American Bar Foundation could take on the 
task of aggregating and analyzing data or alternatively, suggests greater 
collaboration with empirical scholars directly to meet this need.79  Professor 
Elizabeth Chambliss also suggests a role for academics, in addition to 
pointing out the utility of task forces and independent program evaluators.80 
To move toward evidence-based promulgation, state supreme courts could 
benefit from accessing external expertise.  Additional attention is needed to 
define the processes through which they do so. 
 
 76. Wald, supra note 3, at 157–58. 
 77. GILLIAN HADFIELD & LUCY RICCA, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., INDEPENDENT REGULATOR OF LEGAL SERVICES POLICY OUTLINE iv (2019), https://iaals. 
du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/iaals_independent_regulator_of_legal_ 
services_policy_outline.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5U7-L5EH]. 
 78. Andrew L. Kaufman, Ethics 2000—Some Heretical Thoughts, 2001 J. PRO. LAW. 
(SYMP. ISSUE) 1, 5–6. 
 79. Carole Silver, What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us:  The Need for Empirical Research 
in Regulating Lawyers and Legal Services in the Global Economy, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1009, 
1074–75 (2010). 
 80. Chambliss, supra note 24, at 336, 338–39, 345. 
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C.  Formalizing Consumer Protection 
The current promulgation process for disciplinary rules is dominated by 
lawyers and includes an outsized role for the organized bar.81  Much of the 
critique of this process—and the rules adopted through it—is that professed 
concerns for consumer protection cloak naked self-interest.  The call for 
empirical evidence of the effects of substantive reforms is designed, in part, 
to force the profession to more objectively analyze consumer protection 
issues.  In this section, I consider how the promulgation process might be 
reformed to enhance consideration of consumer perspectives. 
Requirements for the inclusion of nonlawyers within the bodies charged 
with generating or reviewing proposed reforms to the rules of professional 
conduct is one way to promote consumers’ interests (as well as to help 
counter antitrust concerns).  However, the mechanisms through which such 
individuals join rulemaking bodies and the processes through which their 
advice is given and documented could affect the extent to which consumer 
protection is prioritized. 
Similar concerns about responsiveness to consumer needs are addressed 
by the Internal Revenue Service through its Taxpayer Advocate Service.  The 
service is an independent organization within the agency devoted to 
protecting taxpayers’ rights.82  The agency maintains offices in every state to 
engage with taxpayers who have problems and it presents an annual report to 
Congress identifying systemic issues.83  This institutionalizes a voice for 
consumer concerns and generates a supporting evidentiary record. 
Formalizing consumer representation within the promulgation process for 
rules of professional conduct presents an alternative to relying on members 
of the bar to overcome their conflicts of interest and protect the consumer 
interest, assuming judges will appoint individuals who can represent the 
public interest on an ad hoc basis, or counting on consumer-focused entities 
to mobilize in response to proposed reforms. 
D.  Composition of Rulemakers 
Finally, empirical evidence could facilitate greater consideration of the 
composition of rulemaking bodies.  This could include identifying the 
characteristics of those individuals involved in the promulgation process, as 
well as incorporating evidence-based approaches to ensure these bodies are 
populated such that they are capable of representing the interests of the 
profession and the public. 
 
 81. See Green, supra note 26, at 1156 (“The [disciplinary] rules are drafted by bar 
associations, promulgated by courts, enforced by disciplinary or grievance committees, and 
interpreted by both courts and bar committees.  These institutions are dominated by lawyers.”); 
Wolfram, supra note 5, at 16–18. 
 82. See We’re Your Voice at the IRS, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., https://taxpayeradvocate. 
irs.gov [https://perma.cc/924R-3B2V] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 83. See Who We Are, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/ 
about-us [https://perma.cc/AP8D-LTNS] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
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Because state supreme court justices are ultimately responsible for the 
promulgation of rules of professional conduct, such questions are logically 
directed to them.  Understanding their characteristics—including how they 
are selected and how they retain their positions, their political ideologies and 
formative professional experiences, and their individual attributes—may 
help to inform decisions about the extent to which they should carry out their 
responsibilities independently, with input from additional advisors, or 
through delegation. 
Many state judges are elected through a process that has become 
increasingly politicized in some places.84  Institutional analyses of 
professional regulation note that elections, while often criticized as limiting 
judges’ independence,  may enhance justices’ accountability to the public.85  
Future analysis might investigate the relationship between the methods for 
selecting judges and the types of procedures they use in assessing reforms to 
professional rules, with implications for ongoing debates about the optimal 
approach to judicial selection. 
The role of political ideology, while emphasized in the context of judicial 
adjudication, is also relevant in the context of rulemaking.86  Finally, in light 
of criticisms that professional regulations are increasingly disconnected from 
the realities of modern legal practice,87 consideration of justices’ professional 
experiences prior to joining the bench may also be relevant.  Understanding 
the representativeness of justices might influence the types of procedures that 
are most likely to result in professional regulation that serves the needs of 
lawyers and the public interest. 
In addition, rulemakers’ individual characteristics are also relevant.  
Professor Brooke Coleman has recently written about the importance of 
racial, ethnic, and gender diversity on the committee charged with overseeing 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.88  She argues that greater diversity 
would result in better rules89 and it is essential to ameliorate our history of 
exclusion.90  Similar arguments could be made in the context of professional 
regulatory rulemaking.  State courts are dominated by white men.91  While 
the level of racial, ethnic, and gender representation on state courts varies 
 
 84. HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT:  CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN STATE 
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 200–01 (2015). 
 85. Barton, supra note 36, at 1185–86. 
 86. See Brooke D. Coleman, #Sowhitemale:  Federal Civil Rulemaking, 113 NW. U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 407, 409 (2019). 
 87. See, e.g., Jessica K. Steinberg et al., Judges and the Deregulation of Legal Services, 
89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1318–24 (2021); Wald, supra note 3, at 158. 
 88. See Coleman, supra note 86, at 424. 
 89. Id. at 427 (noting that “in a context like federal civil rulemaking, diverse decision-
making bodies are ‘smarter’”). 
 90. Id. at 429. 
 91. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Measuring Justice in State Courts:  The 
Demographics of the State Judiciary, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1887, 1907 fig.7, 1908 tbl.5 (2017) 
(comparing white men’s representation in the state judiciary to their representation in the 
population and noting the racial and gender composition of appellate state courts). 
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across states, in no state is the state judiciary as diverse as the state population 
on these dimensions.92 
Together, these considerations may militate in favor of a process in which 
state supreme courts delegate at least a portion of their rulemaking authority.  
Future work could identify best practices for populating these subsidiary 
bodies or for otherwise ensuring that diverse perspectives are incorporated 
into the rule promulgation process. 
III.  EVIDENCE-BASED PROMULGATION IN PRACTICE 
Proponents suggest that the adoption of evidence-based substantive 
regulation will not only enhance the quality of professional regulation but 
serves to counter challenges to the profession’s right to self-regulate.93  A 
similar argument can be made with regard to evidence-based promulgation; 
enhancing the rule promulgation process could address criticism of 
professional regulation while also improving substantive regulation by 
elevating the process through which it is proposed, reviewed, and adopted. 
However, it is important to recognize that changes to the promulgation 
process may not result in dramatic changes to the substance of regulations; 
even if they do, they may not address the underlying concerns motivating 
calls for reform.  For example, the Washington State Supreme Court 
announced in the summer of 2020 that the Limited License Legal 
Technicians program, once heralded as the “way of the future of law,”94 will 
sunset.95  Although this program was a function of more than simply the 
state’s rules of professional conduct, its rise and fall illustrate how 
innovations made possible through such reforms face additional hurdles—
cultural, economic, or practical—in successfully altering the legal 
profession.96 
Moreover, it is possible that a move toward evidence-based promulgation 
is simply not feasible under the current state-based approach to professional 
regulation.  Attempts to undertake structural reforms in the context of 
 
 92. TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, THE GAVEL GAP:  WHO 
SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS tbl.A-14 (2016), https://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBL4-FLA7]. 
 93. See Chambliss, supra note 24, at 318. 
 94. Mary Jeutten, The Limited License Legal Technician Is the Way of the Future of Law, 
ABA J. (Dec. 8, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
the_limited_license_legal_technician_story_start_with_why [https://perma.cc/C2GA-6D63]. 
 95. Letter from Debra L. Stephens, C.J., Wash. State Sup. Ct., to Stephen R. Crossland, 
Chair, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd., Terra Nevitt, Interim Exec. Dir., Wash. State Bar 
Ass’n & Rajeev Majumdar, President, Wash. State Bar Ass’n (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.abajournal.com/files/Stephens_LLLT_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS3Q-AJRK]. 
 96. See Lyle Moran, How the Washington Supreme Court’s LLLT Program Met Its 
Demise, ABA J. (July 9, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/how-washingtons-
limited-license-legal-technician-program-met-its-demise [https://perma.cc/A67E-3KVH] 
(describing how the Limited License Legal Technicians program was barred from expanding 
into practice areas beyond family law and struggled to attract enough applicants to achieve 
self-sufficiency). 
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professional regulation have not always been successful,97 for a variety of 
reasons.98  In contrast to the states-as-laboratories ethos proposed by the 
ABA, a more centralized approach to regulating the profession might 
actually be more likely to incorporate the types of best practices advocated 
in this Article. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal profession is not inclined toward change.  As Professor Wald 
writes, the drag of history and tradition are particularly strong barriers to 
change for a profession “that builds on respect for authority, established 
rules, hierarchical systems, and history, as well as on precedent.”99  Yet 
threats to the profession’s claim to self-regulation may overcome this inertia.  
Acknowledging this pressure, ABA Resolution 115 embraces the idea of 
states as laboratories and encourages them to undertake forays into new 
forms of professional regulation that expand access to legal services.100  
Through its emphasis on evidence-based regulations, it also envisions an 
iterative process in which reforms are evaluated on an ongoing basis. 
The process through which such reforms will be generated, evaluated, and 
adopted has received less attention.  While scholars and the organized bar 
have recognized the need for additional empirical investigation on the effects 
of regulatory reforms and on topics that serve as the basis for the substance 
of potential reforms, these arguments have generally not been extended to 
the rule promulgation process.  In this Article, I advocate a parallel shift 
toward evidence-based promulgation.  The hope is that such a shift might 
justify the profession’s long claim to self-regulation by enhancing the 
substance of professional regulation. 
  
 
 97. See, e.g., John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation:  Learning from 
Ohio’s Struggle to Reform Its Disciplinary System, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 82 (1999) 
(recounting the failures of an attempt to reform Ohio’s disciplinary process). 
 98. Bruce A. Green, ABA Ethics Reform from “MDP” to “20/20”:  Some Cautionary 
Reflections, 2009 J. PRO. LAW. (SYMP. ISSUE) 1, 11. 
 99. Wald, supra note 9, at 523. 
 100. Given the controversy and compromise revisions to the resolution, one could debate 
the depth of the organized bar’s devotion to these ideas. 
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APPENDIX 
Sources of Authority for Rule Promulgation by State 
State Authority for Rule Promulgation 
Alabama ALA. PRO. CONDUCT. R.
Alaska ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15; ALASKA BAR R. 62.
Arizona ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 28.
Arkansas 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-11-116 (2020); 
Committee on Civil Practice, ARK. JUDICIARY, 
https://www.arcourts.gov/administration/boards-committees/committee-
civil-practice [https://perma.cc/MSQ3-KJ94] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021); 
In re Ark. Bar Ass’n Petition to Amend Rules 1.2, 4.2 & 4.3 of the Ark. 
Rules of Pro. Conduct, No. CV–16–187 (Ark. May 12, 2016).  
California 
CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE §§ 6011–15, 6076–77 (West 2020);  
2020–21 Board of Trustees, STATE BAR OF CAL., 
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Board-of-
Trustees/Roster [https://perma.cc/HU6B-W7ZD] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Colorado 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-2-110 (2020);  
Order Establishing the Colorado Supreme Court Standing Committee on 
the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (Colo. June 24, 2003); 
Rules of Professional Conduct Standing Committee, COLO. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Committees/Com
mittee.cfm?Committee_ID=24 [https://perma.cc/5625-P3LL]  
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Connecticut 
Wesley W. Horton et al., Preface to 1 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES, 
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULES (2020 ed.); 
Edward L. Johnson Jr., Connecticut Bar Association History:  1975–
2000, 75 CONN. BAR J. 185, 194–95 (2001).
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 161; (2020) DEL. SUP. CT. R. 96. 
Florida FLA. BAR R. 1-12.1(a), (f); 1-1.21(f), (g).
Georgia 
GA. BAR R. 5-101; Bob Ambrogi, Georgia Moves Closer to Adopting 





HAW. SUP. CT. R. 17(b); 
HAW PRO. CONDUCT R. (HAW. SUP. CT. COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, 
Proposed Amendments Draft Sept. 26, 2019). 
Idaho IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 906.
Illinois ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.
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Indiana 
Order Amending Indiana Rules of Court (Ind. Dec. 19, 2019); 
Proposed Rule Amendments, IND. CTS., 
https://www.in.gov/judiciary/2685.htm [https://perma.cc/F5GB-2P7N] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Iowa Order:  Request for Public Comment on Proposed Amendments to Chapter 32, Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct (Iowa Aug. 1, 2019).
Kansas 
Proposed Rule 241:  Rules Relating to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client 
Protection, KAN. SUP. CT., 
https://www.kscourts.org/KSCourts/media/KsCourts/Rules_Open_Comm
ent/Proposed-Rule-241.pdf?ext=.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J6GZ-VPSU] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
Kentucky 
KY. CONST. § 116;  
KBA Ethics 2000 Committee Report, KY. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.kybar.org/page/KBAEthics2000Rpt [https://perma.cc/S9GL-
D3PS] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
Louisiana 
Dane S. Ciolino, Introductory Materials:  Historical Background of 
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, LA. LEGAL ETHICS, 
https://lalegalethics.org/louisiana-rules-of-professional-
conduct/introductory-materials 
[https://perma.cc/5TJ3-Y9UB] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
Maine 
Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics, STATE OF ME. JUD. BRANCH 
(May 6, 2019), https://www.courts.maine.gov/about/committees/judic-
ethics.html [https://perma.cc/WN2M-QCNS].
Maryland 
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a); 
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 13-301 (LexisNexis 2020); 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, MD. CTS., 
https://www.mdcourts.gov/rules [https://perma.cc/L8KH-WMA6] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
Massachusetts 
Mass Sup. Jud. Ct, Rule Changes and Invitations to Comment on 
Proposed Rules and Amendments, MASS.GOV, 
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/rule-changes-and-invitations-to-
comment-on-proposed-rules-and-amendments 
[https://perma.cc/6JXE-THWK] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021);  
Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Standing Advisory Committee on the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-
details/standing-advisory-committee-on-the-rules-of-professional-conduct 
[https://perma.cc/H5SV-VUDR] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
Michigan 
Marcia L. Proctor, The Michigan Professional Regulatory System, 74 
MICH. BAR J. 144 (1995); 
Pro. Ethics Comm., Rule of the Committee, STATE BAR OF MICH. (Jan. 
27, 2012), http://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/committee_pdfs/ 
pec_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3BM-T8DX].
Minnesota 37 DUNNELL MINNESOTA DIGEST Courts § 13.06 (6th ed. Supp. 2020). 
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Mississippi 
Rules for Comment, STATE OF MISS. JUDICIARY, https://courts.ms.gov/ 
research/rules/rulesforcomment/rulesforcomment.php 
[https://perma.cc/2ULT-E2L3] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
Missouri MO. SUP. CT. R. 7.06; id. r. 5.3(d).
Montana 
Extensive Updates to Montana Rules of Professional Conduct Adopted 




Nebraska NEB. SUP. CT. R. § 1-103. 
Nevada Order Repealing Rules 150-203.5 of the Supreme Court Rules and Adopting the Nevada Rules Of Professional Conduct (Nev. Feb. 6, 2006).
New Hampshire 
Order Adopting Amendments to Court Rules (N.H. July 15, 2019); 
Committees––Advisory Committee on Rules, N.H. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/adviscommrules/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZW82-H62A] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
New Jersey 
N.J. SUP. CT., ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS BY THE SUPREME 
COURT ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE ON ATTORNEY ETHICS AND ADMISSIONS (2016), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/notices/2016/n160414a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZK58-ZJ6X]. 
New Mexico N.M. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 23-106.1.
New York ROY D. SIMON, SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED § 8.251, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020). 
North Carolina 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23 (2020);  
Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct, N.C. STATE 
BAR, https://www.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/ethics/proposed-amendments-
to-the-rules-of-professional-conduct [https://perma.cc/W42K-EXAQ] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
North Dakota 
N.D. SUP. CT. R. 3.1–5; 
Joint Committee on Attorney Standards, STATE OF N.D. CTS., 
https://www.ndcourts.gov/supreme-court/committees/joint-committee-on-
attorney-standards [https://perma.cc/D8BR-65XZ] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Ohio OH. CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g).
Oklahoma 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 13 (2021);  
Policy Regarding Submission of Rule Changes, OKLA. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 
24, 2009), https://www.okbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ 
judicial-rule-changes1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKT4-59GG].  
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 9.490 (2020). 
Pennsylvania 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7.1–10 (2020).
Rhode Island Order In re Proposed Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct with Proposed Comments (R.I. Sept. 13, 2006).
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South Carolina 
S.C. APP. CT. R. 401 (establishing the South Carolina Bar); id. r. 420; 
Professional Responsibility Committee, S.C. BAR, 
https://www.scbar.org/lawyers/sections-committees-divisions/ 
committees/professional-responsibility-committee/?edit_off=true 
[https://perma.cc/FSL5-LA88] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
South Dakota 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-17-3.1A (2020);  
Letter from David Gilbertson, C.J., Sup. Ct. of South Dakota, to All 





Learn About the Development of Rules of Professional Conduct, TENN. 
BAR ASS’N, https://www.tba.org/index.cfm? pg=Development-of-Rules-
Professional-Conduct  
[https:// perma.cc/DP2N-5EC4] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
Texas TEX. GOV. CODE ANN. §§ 81.0871–94 (West 2020).
Utah UTAH SUP. CT. PRO. PRAC. R., ch. 11, art. 1.
Vermont 
Professional Responsibility Board, VT. JUDICIARY, 
https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/about-vermont-judiciary/boards-and-
commitees/professional-responsibility [https://perma.cc/G8W9-6M9M] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Virginia 
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-700 (2020);  
JUD. COUNCIL OF VA., 2018 REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND 




GR 9––Supreme Court Rulemaking and Schedule for Review, 
WASH. CTS., https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa= 
court_rules.gr9summary [https://perma.cc/U2H7-W8WX] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
West Virginia 
W.V. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (highlighting the rule-making authority of the 
state’s supreme court);  
Rules Order (W. Va. Sept. 29, 2014).
Wisconsin WIS. SUP. CT. I.O.P. IV–V.
Wyoming Order Amending the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law (Wyo. June 25, 2019).
 
